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In  recent  years,  the  renminbi  (RMB)  exchange  rate  and  China's  exchange  rate  policy  have 
received extensive attention from the international community. Is the RMB undervalued? If so, 
by how much it is undervalued? Should the RMB be allowed to appreciate? These questions 
have caused fierce debate both at home and abroad. Though there is no unanimous agreement 
as  to  how  much  the  RMB  is  undervalued,  researchers  are  unanimous  that  the  RMB  is 
undervalued. For example, Goldstein (2004) estimates that the RMB was undervalued by 15%-
30%  in  2003,  according  to  a  simple  fundamental  equilibrium  exchange  rate  (FEER)  model. 
Frankel (2004) uses a modified purchasing power parity method to estimate that the RMB was 
undervalued by 35% in 2000 and judges that it is undervalued by at least that much at present. 
Shi and Yu (2005) use a behavior equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) model to conclude that the 
RMB was undervalued by about 12% on average during 2002-2004. Coudert and Couharde 
(2005) also use a FEER model to estimate that the RMB was undervalued by 23% in 2003. 
No  matter  whether  a  currency  is  under-  or  overvalued,  exchange  rate  misalignment 
certainly  results  in  a  distortion  that  exerts  a  negative  impact  on  the  structure  and 
macroeconomic performance of an economy. For example, in recent years, the Chinese economy 
has been in a state of obvious external and internal imbalance, which certainly has something to 
do with undervaluation of the RMB.1 According to the Swan Diagram, a classic framework for 
analyzing macroeconomic policy in an open economy, allowing the RMB to appreciate is a 
direct and effective method for resolving imbalances of the Ch inese economy, but the Chinese 
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1 Specifically, external imbalance is evidenced by the large current account surplus and a big growth in foreign 
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government seems hesitant to allow it to appreciate (Shi, 2006).23  Instead, it would rather adopt 
other measures such as adjusting export tax rebates, relaxing controls on capital outflows, and 
adjusting the interest rate or deposit reserve ratio, etc., to deal with external and internal 
imbalances of the economy. 
Why then, when the RMB is obviously undervalued, and the Chinese economy suffers from 
external and internal imbalances, does the Chinese g overnment still resist RMB appreciation? 
According  to  the  traditional  textbook  macroeconomic  model,  currency  appreciations  are 
contractionary: in the short run,  currency appreciation will raise the price of domestic goods 
relative to the price of foreign goods (namely, real exchange rate appreciation), causing exports 
to drop and the substitution of home-produced goods with imported goods, thereby reducing 
aggregate demand.4  So, hesitation by the Chinese g overnment is consistent with traditional 
macroeconomic theory. Although the Chinese government has announced that China does not 
pursue too large a trade surplus (indicating that Chinese policymakers would like to reduce the 
surplus through various means), the Chines e government certainly worries that an RMB 
appreciation would be contractionary. This would have a negative impact on China's economic 
growth and employment, even pushing the Chinese economy into a long -term recession, as 
happened to Japan during the 1990s. In a situation where there is a high rate of unemployment 
caused by  economic reforms and transition to a market economy, keeping a high rate of 
economic growth and maintaining employment are obviously   central goals of the Chinese 
Government. 
Must currency appreciations be contractionary and depreciations expansionary? At least 
since  Hirschman  (1949),  economists  have  realized  that  appreciations  are  not  necessarily 
contractionary, nor are depreciations necessarily expansionary. Following Krugman and Taylor 
(1978), a so-called ―contractionary devaluations‖ literature has evolved.5 On the demand side, 
the  emphasis  is  on  the  expenditure-changing  effects  of  exchange  rate  changes  ignored  by 
                            
2  Under  China‘s  new  exchange  rate  regime,  if  the  monetary  authorities  either,  reduce  the  intensity  of  exchange 
market intervention, or widen the band within which the RMB exchange rate can float, the market will promote the 
RMB to appreciate progressively because of the steady expectation of RMB appreciation. 
3 In this chapter, the terms ―appreciation‖ and ―revaluation‖ are used interchangeably. 
4 This is the expenditure-switching effect of an exchange rate change. 
5 This literature is mainly about the exchange rate policy of developing countries. Devaluations are usually included 
in the stabilization programs of developing countries and balance of payment problems in developing countries 
generally  are  due  to  devaluation  pressures.  Therefore,  the  ―contractionary  devaluations‖  literature  mainly 
investigates the situation of devaluation. However, many of the channels through which contractionary devaluations 
work are equally applicable to revaluations. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     34 
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traditional  macroeconomic  theory,  providing  a  series  of  mechanisms  and  channels  through 
which devaluation can cause output to drop. On the supply side, the literature demonstrates the 
―contractionary devaluations‖ effect mainly through the influence of devaluation on the cost of 
imported intermediate goods, wage costs, and firm's working capital.6 After the 1994 Mexico 
currency crisis and the 1997 -98 East Asian financial crisis  the ―contractionary devaluations‖ 
literature  gained  the  renewed  attention  of  economists  (Kamin  and  Rogers,  2000).  Recent 
research  emphasizes  the  importance  of  balance  sheet  effects  in  explaining  the  economic 
recession caused by devaluation during financial crises (Frankel, 2005). 
According to the ―contractionary devaluations‖ literature, currency revaluations are likely 
to have an expansionary rather than a contractionary impact on the economy in developing 
countries. For instance, currency revaluation has a real cash balance effect and a real wealth 
effect: it lowers the domestic price level, therefore leading to real cash balance and real wealth 
increases, which tend to expand personal spending (Bruno, 1979; Gylfason and Radetzki, 1991). 
Currency revaluation also has an income reallocation effect: it tends to transfer real income from 
groups  with  a  high  marginal  propensity  to  save  towards  groups  with  a  low  marginal 
propensity  to  save,  causing  total  domestic  expenditure  to  expand  (Diaz-Alejandro,  1963; 
Cooper, 1971; Krugman and Taylor, 1978). This is because revaluation raises real wages through 
a reduction in the price level, causing real income to shift from entrepreneurs to labor, with the 
latter having a higher marginal propensity to consume. This income reallocation effect may be 
quite strong in developing countries, because labor in developing countries usually has limited 
wealth and is subject to tight liquidity constraints, so marginal propensities to consume are 
nearly  equal  to  one.  Moreover,  in  developing  countries  new  equipment  investment  usually 
includes a large amount of imported capital goods.  Consequently,  currency  revaluation  will 
lower  the  domestic  prices  of  those  goods,  helping  to  expand  investment  expenditure  and, 
therefore,  total  expenditure  (Branson,  1986;  van  Wijnbergen,  1986).7  Finally,  currency 
revaluation will lower the domestic prices of imported intermediate goods and raw materials, 
such as petroleum and minerals, which, in turn, will lower the production costs of all final 
goods (including non-tradable goods). The reduction in marginal costs relative to the price of 
final goods will lead to increased output and employment (Bruno, 1979; van Wijnbergen, 1986). 
                            
6 See Lizondo and Montiel (1989) for a survey of the ―contractionary devaluations‖ literature. Caves, Frankel and 
Jones (2002) provide a simple introduction to 10 kinds of ―contractionary devaluations‖ effects. 
7 These are the expenditure-changing effects of an exchange rate change. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     35 
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Therefore,  even  if  the  net  effect  of  revaluation  on  aggregate  demand  is  contractionary  (the 
expenditure-switching effect is large enough to dominate the expenditure-changing effect), the 
supply-side effect might still result in the revaluation being expansionary. 
Regarding the empirical literature, most of the research on the relationship between real 
exchange rates and output in developing countries demonstrates that real devaluations have 
been  contractionary  while  real  appreciations  have  been  expansionary,  suggesting  that  the 
channels of the ―contractionary devaluations‖ literature are important in developing countries. 
For example, in some early influential research, Edwards (1986) used a reduced form equation 
model to study a panel data set of 12 developing countries, finding that devaluations were 
contractionary in the short-term, but were expansionary after one year, and were neutral in the 
long-term. Gylfason and Radetzki (1991) used a macroeconomic simulation method to find that 
for the 12 developing countries studied, devaluations were all contractionary in the short-term 
as well as in the medium-term. Kamin and Rogers (2000) used a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model to study the relationship, between the real exchange rate and output in Mexico. They 
found that real devaluations were contractionary, while real appreciations were expansionary. 
Other recent research, such as Hoffmaister and Vegh (1996) on Uruguay; Moreno (1999) on six 
East Asian countries; Akinlo and Odusola (2003) on Nicaragua; and Berument and Pasaogullari 
(2003) on Turkey, supports the ―contractionary devaluations‖ hypothesis. 
What then is the relationship between the real RMB exchange rate and China‘s output? Are 
RMB appreciations contractionary as per the textbook model or expansionary, as suggested by 
the  ―contractionary  devaluations‖  hypothesis?    The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  study  the 
effects of the real RMB exchange rate on China's output by applying VAR models to a sample 
over the period 1991q1--2005q3. In order to provide a background for the issues to be discussed, 
the next section contains a brief historical review of China‘s exchange rate regime, covering  
valuation of the RMB real exchange rate, and China‘s output during the past decade; then the 
models employed and the data used are described, along with a discussion of the time-series 
characteristics of the variables; the following section presents the results of econometric analysis 
of the VAR models through impulse-response function graphs and variance decompositions of 
forecast errors; and finally the conclusions drawn from this research are summarized. 
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A Brief History of RMB Exchange Rate Valuation and China’s Output Fluctuations 
In the early-1990s, China implemented a double exchange rate system whereby an official fixed 
exchange  rate  coexisted  with a  market  exchange  rate formed  in  the  swap foreign  exchange 
market.  By  1992,  up  to  80%  of  foreign  exchange  transactions  were  conducted  in  the  swap 
foreign exchange market and the market exchange rate essentially reflected the demand for and 
supply  of  foreign  exchange.  The  swap  market  exchange  rate  was  higher  than  the  official 
exchange rate, implying a subsidy to exporters. Consequently, the double exchange rate system 
caused unfair competition as well as resource-use distortion and was unfavorable to foreign 
direct  investors.8  Against these negative effects, the official exchange rate of the RMB was 
increasing (devaluing) constantly, from 4.7 y uan per U.S. dollar in 1990, to 5.4 yuan per U.S. 
dollar in 1992, and to 5.8 yuan per U.S. dollar by the end of 1993. On January 1, 1994, China 
reformed its double exchange rate system by unifying the two exchange rates and established a 
single and managed  floating exchange rate system based on market supply and demand. 
Afterwards, the nominal rate of the   RMB went through disconnected modest periods   of 
appreciation. This continued until 1997 when the East Asian financial crisis occurred. 
 Under conditions where external demand dropped and the currencies of China‘s principal 
trading partners depreciated against the U.S. dollar by a wide margin (except Hong Kong), 
market  participants  generally  anticipated  that  the  RMB  would  follow  those  currencies  and 
depreciate.  In  order  to  stabilize  regional  exchange  rates  and  prevent  currencies  from 
competitive devaluation, the Chinese Government announced against market expectation that 
RMB would not be devalued. From then on, the RMB exchange rate was fixed at 8.28 yuan per 
U.S. dollar, and the so-called managed float became a de facto dollar peg. This system lasted 
until  July,  2005.  On  July  21,  2005,  China  instituted  reform  of  its  exchange  rate  regime  by 
revaluing the RMB by 2.1% and terminating its peg to the U.S. dollar in favor of a managed 
float based on a basket of currencies. Under the new exchange rate regime, the daily fluctuation 
of the RMB exchange rate was restricted within 0.3% on both sides. Due to market intervention 
conducted by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), the RMB exchange rate has not moved very 
much. Figure 1 portrays the track of the RMB nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar over 
the past 16 years. 
                            
8 Under this kind of system, foreign investment had to be converted into RMB according to the official exchange rate 
first,  when  foreign  investors  needed  foreign  exchange,  however,  they  could  only  obtain  it  through  the  foreign 
exchange swap market, at the market exchange rate. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     37 
 


































































































Figure 1: RMB Nominal Exchange Rate (Yuan/US Dollar)
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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Notes: REER stands for an index of the RMB real exchange rate, an increase indicating an appreciation; GDP stands 
for de-trended real gross domestic product. See the third section for a definition and explanation of the variables 
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In contrast to the relative stability of the bilateral nominal rate of the RMB, the real effective 
exchange  rate  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  real  exchange  rate)  of  the  RMB  has  fluctuated 
significantly. As can be seen from Figure 2, the real exchange rate of the RMB has gone through 
six stages over the past 10 years: 
(1) 1991q1-1993q2: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a large amount of depreciation, 
mainly because the nominal rate of RMB exhibited a large devaluation;  
(2) 1993q3-1998q1: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a large amount of appreciation, 
mainly  because  of higher  inflation  in  China  during  the  period  and  also  a  small  amount  of 
appreciation of the RMB nominal rate. After the East Asian financial crisis, appreciation of the 
RMB real exchange rate was due mainly to sharp devaluations in the currencies of some of 
China‘s trade partners;  
(3) 1998q2-1999q4: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a certain degree of depreciation, 
mainly because there appeared to be deflation in China;  
(4) 2000q1-2002q1: a certain degree of appreciation of the RMB real exchange rate occurred 
in this period. This was due to mild inflation in China and deflation in its trade partners during 
this period. In 2002q1, the real exchange rate of the RMB rebounded to the previous level of 
1997q4;  
(5) 2002q2-2005q1: the RMB real exchange rate experienced a large depreciation. This was 
influenced mainly by the fact that the U.S. dollar depreciated against the Euro, the Japanese yen, 
and other key currencies, so the RMB also depreciated against those currencies; and 
(6) 2005q2  and  q3:  as  a  result  of  appreciation  of  the  U.S.  dollar  against  the  Euro  and 
Japanese yen, the RMB real exchange rate returned to a state of appreciation. 
An  investigation  of  the  de-trended  real  output  data  of  China  reveals  that  China‘s  real 
output also experienced large fluctuations over the same period.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s cyclical output over the entire 
sample period (1991q1-2005q3) is actually not that clear. However, since 2000q1, there has been 
an obvious negative correlation: appreciations of the real exchange rate have been associated 
with  falls  in  cyclical  output,  while  real  depreciations  have  been  followed  by  expansions  in 
cyclical output. The relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output is in 
accord  with  the  forecast  of  traditional  open  economy  macroeconomics  where  RMB 
appreciations are contractionary, while RMB depreciations are expansionary. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     39 
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However, for the observed correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s 
output in Figure 2, two issues still need to be clarified:  
(1) Whether the tight correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output is 
spurious (i.e., whether it is simply reflecting the response of both variables to a third external 
variable when the two variables actually have nothing to do with each other). For example, a 
change  in  government  spending  will  influence  the  real  exchange  rate  while  influencing 
aggregate  demand.  Models  in  the  Mundell-Fleming  tradition  predict  that  an  increase  in 
government  spending  raises  the  real  interest  rate,  leading  to  an  appreciation  of  the  real 
exchange rate.9  
(2) The nature of the causality between real exchange rates  and output, assuming they are 
truly relevant. In other words, does a change in the RMB real exchange rate cause the change in 
output or, conversely, does a change in output cause the change in the RMB real exchange rate? 
In  order  to  answer  these  questions,   a  preliminary  pair -wise  Granger  causality  test  was 
conducted in order to examine the Granger causality between the RMB real exchange rate and 
China‘s  output.  The  Granger  causality  tests  indicate  whether  a  set  of  lagged  variables  has 
explanatory  power  with  respect  to  the  other  variables.  If  the  computed  F-statistics  are 
significant, we can claim in Granger‘s sense that one variable causes the other variable. 
Table 1 reports the results of the Granger causality test. The result of the test for the whole 
sample (1991q1-2005q3) shows that, with a 95% level of confidence, the sample data reject the 
null hypothesis. This indicates that China‘s output Granger causes the RMB real exchange rate 
and the RMB real exchange rate Granger causes output as well. 
Because there seems to be a difference in the relationship between the RMB real exchange 
rate and China‘s output before and after 2000q1, the whole sample was divided into two sub-
samples (1991q1-1999q4  and  2000q1-2005q3),  and  two  separate  Granger  causality  tests were 
conducted. The results were surprising. For the first sub-sample (1991q1-1999q4), the data reject 
the null hypothesis with a 99% or higher level of confidence, suggesting that output Granger 
causes  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate  Granger  causes  output  as  well. 
However,  the  second  sub-sample  (2000q1-2005q3)  in  which  there  seems  to  be  a  strong 
correlation between output and the real exchange rate cannot reject the null hypothesis. This 
                            
9 In contrast, the sticky-price inter-temporal models of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics predict a fall in the 
real interest rate in response to an increase in government spending (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995), hence a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     40 
 
China's Agricultural Trade: Issues and Prospects 
shows a strange result that output does not Granger cause the real exchange rate; nor does the 
real  exchange  rate  Granger  cause  output.  This  means  that  neither  variable  is  helpful  in 
explaining the movement of the other. One explanation of this unexpected result may be the 
small number of observations in the second sub-sample, resulting in a small F-Statistic. Another 
explanation may be that there were other variables simultaneously influencing both the RMB 
real  exchange  rate  as  well  as  China‘s  output,  thus  limiting  the  usefulness  of  the  pair-wise 
Granger causality test. 
Table 1: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1991Q1--2005Q3 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  55   2.65   0.04 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   2.85   0.03 
Subsample: 1991Q1--1999Q4 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  32   3.69   0.02 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   9.38   0.00 
Subsample: 2000Q1--2005Q3 
  Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
  GDP does not Granger Cause REER  23   0.86   0.51 
  REER does not Granger Cause GDP   0.52   0.72 
   
In order to investigate the relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output 
more  precisely,  we  employ  VAR  models  to  control  for  the  influence  of  variables  that  may 
impact both the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output, thereby answering the earlier 
questions. The estimated VAR models also let us study other interesting issues. 
Model and Data 
The  Models:  VAR  models  are  used  to  study  the  relationship  between  the  RMB  real 
exchange rate and China‘s output. The goal is to study whether the correlation indicated in 
Figure 2 is spurious and to determine the direction of causality between the real exchange rate 
and  output.  Due  to  the  relatively  small  sample  size,  not  all  variables  of  interest  could  be 
included  within  one  VAR  model,  so  the  modeling  strategy  of  Kamin  and  Rogers  (2000)  is 
adopted.10 
                            
10 Because a VAR model involves estimating quite a lot of parameters, introducing too many endogenous variables will 
cause serious loss of degrees of freedom, thereby affecting the statistical dependability of the results. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     41 
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A basic model is estimated first and then expanded by entering another external variable to 
the  basic  model  each  time.  Following  Kamin  and  Rogers  (2000),  the  basic  model  includes 
China's gross domestic product (GDP), the RMB real effective exchange rate (REER), China's 
inflation rate (INFL), and foreign gross domestic product (GDPF). Following the tradition of the 
business cycle literature, the gross domestic product data are de-trended so as to focus upon the 
growth  cycle.  Therefore,  GDP  and  GDPF  represent  the  cyclical  components  of  the  gross 
domestic product (or GDP gap) of China and foreign countries respectively. There are several 
considerations  when  selecting  these  four  variables.  GDPF  is  treated  as  a  proxy  for  external 
shocks  to  the  Chinese  economy.  GDP  and  REER  are  the  variables  of  interest.  INFL  is  the 
―intermediate‖ variable in-between the real exchange rate and output, proxying all possible 
channels for linking the real exchange rate to output.  In contrast to Kamin and Rogers (2000), 
GDPF was used instead of the U.S. interest rate as the proxy for external factors. This is because 
China still implements capital controls. Therefore, the relationship between the U.S. interest rate 
and  China‘s  interest  rate  should  not  be  that  close.  On  the  other  hand,  after  allowing 
convertibility of the RMB for current account transactions and formally joining the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the openness of China's real economy is constantly increasing. The ratio of 
foreign  trade  to  GDP  in  China  has  now  reached  a  high  level  of  70%.  In  this  situation,  the 
business cycles of its trading partners have an important influence on China‘s business cycles 
through import and export channels. 
The basic model is too parsimonious to allow us to investigate more comprehensively the 
influence of variables that affect both the real exchange rate and output; and so it may not be a 
particularly  efficient  means  to  study  the  problem  of  spurious  correlation.  For  example,  it 
provides little sense of which channels link the real exchange rate to output. Therefore, one 
endogenous variable is added to the basic model each time. Additionally, other VAR models 
are estimated. This determines whether the final results are robust, while allowing for control of 
the size of the VAR model within the appropriate level according to the sample. Government 
spending  (GOV)  and  money  supply  (M2)  are  entered,  respectively,  into  the  basic  model  to 
examine  fiscal  and  monetary  channels  in  the  relationship  between  real  exchange  rates  and 
output.  In  addition,  the  U.S.  interest  rate  (RUS)  is  included  to  allow  investigation  of  the 
international financial linkages of the Chinese economy, and examination of the efficiency of 
capital controls in China. Therefore, besides the basic model (Model 1), three more VAR models Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     42 
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are  estimated.  The  models  can  be  expressed  in  the  form  of  an  unrestricted  VAR  model  as 
follows: 
(1)             
l k
l l l l l l l
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klindicates the lags of lth VAR model, 
l
i A  is the parameter matrix of the lth VAR model for 
=1,2,..., l ik , 
l
t ε  is a random residual vector of lth VAR model，
l o is the zero mean vector of  
l
t ε , 
and 
l Ω   is  a  covariance  matrix  of 
l
t ε .  According  to  the  AIC  criterion  and  the  SC  criterion 
different numbers of lags are tried for each VAR model, and the optimum number of lags turns 
out to be 4 for all four models. 
The familiar two-stage approach is used to estimate the VAR models. At the first stage, the 
variables  are  regressed  on  lags  of  all  the  variables  in  the  system.  At  the  second  stage,  the 
Cholesky  decomposition  technique  used  by  Sims  (1980)  is  employed  to  orthogonalize  the 
residuals so as to identify the primitive structural system. The Cholesky decomposition imposes 
a recursive contemporaneous causal structure on the VAR models. The model variables are 
ordered in a particular sequence, and variables higher in the ordering are assumed to cause 
contemporaneous changes in variables lower in the ordering. Variables lower in the ordering 
are  assumed  to  affect  variables  higher  in  the  ordering  only  with  a  lag.  Because  of  that, 
determining a reasonable order for endogenous variables is an important issue in employing a 
VAR model. The variable orders of our four models are selected as above. The rationale for the 
orderings is discussed below.   
Due to openness of the Chinese economy, GDPF is ordered first because GDPF captures the 
external  shocks  that  may  have  significant  contemporaneous  effects  on  Chinese  economic 
variables  such  as  INFL,  REER,  and  GDP.  On  the  other  hand,  the  outputs  of  China‘s  trade 
partners  as  a  whole  are  unlikely  affected  contemporaneously  by  any  Chinese  economic 
variables.  For  REER,  INFL,  and  GDP,  a  somewhat  different  ordering  to  that  of  Kamin  and Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     43 
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Rogers (2000) is used.11 Since the RMB nominal exchange rate is stable due to hig h official 
intervention, INFL is ordered prior to REER and GDP by assuming that inflation shocks have a 
contemporaneous effect on the RMB real exchange rate and on aggregate demand. In contrast, it 
is assumed that prices are sticky in the short run, so that they respond to the real exchange rate 
and aggregate demand shocks only with lags. REER i s ordered prior to GDP because it i s 
assumed that real exchange rate shocks have a contemporaneous effect on aggr egate demand 
through  either  traditional  channels  or  those  indicated  by  the  ―contractionary  devaluations‖ 
literature, while aggregate demand shocks do not contemporaneously affect the real exchange 
rate.  
In Model 2, GOV is ordered after INFL by assuming that government spending shocks 
affect inflation only with a lag. In Model 3, M2 is ordered prior to INFL under the assumption 
that  as  the  monetary  policy  instrument  in  China,  the  money  supply  reacts,  not  to  realized 
inflation but to expected inflation. In Model 4, RUS is ordered prior to GDPF because U.S. 
interest rate shocks contemporaneously affect world aggregate demand, but due to the relative 
independence of the U.S. economy, the U.S. interest rate is unlikely to be contemporaneously 
affected by world aggregate demand or any Chinese economic variables. 
Data:  The data are quarterly and the sample interval is 1991q1--2005q3. 1991q1 is the 
earliest time for which quarterly gross domestic product data are available for China. The gross 
domestic product data for 2005q4 were collected according to a new statistical method and 
without comparability with the data in the past. Therefore, it is excluded from the sample. 
Except for the inflation rate, the variables are in real terms: the U.S. real interest rate is obtained 
by subtracting the U.S. inflation rate from the nominal interest rate, and other real variables are 
drawn from the nominal ones divided by the consumer price index. The base period is 1992. 
GDPF is calculated according to the trade-weighted average of the gross domestic product 
indices of 14 principal trade partners of China. GDP and GDPF are de-trended gross domestic 
products. In the business cycle literature, the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter is widely used to 
generate the cyclical components. It is well known, however, that the H-P filter has an end-of-
sample problem, such that at the end of the sample the estimates are particularly unreliable. In 
addition, the filter depends on the choice of the ―smoothness parameter,‖ which makes the 
resulting cyclical component and its statistical properties highly sensitive to this choice. These 
                            
11 Kamin and Rogers (2000) adopt the following ordering: REER→ INFL→ GDP. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     44 
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problems become serious when the sample size is small. Because of the relatively small sample, 
the H-P filter is not used in this study. Instead, quadratic de-trending was used to construct the 
GDP and GDPF data, which is implemented by regressing the logarithm of quarterly real gross 
domestic product on a trend and its quadrate. In this study, the regression with a quadratic time 
trend is a better fit than one with a linear time trend. 
REER  is  taken  from  the  International  Financial  Statistics  Database  of  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), with an increase indicating an appreciation. China‘s inflation rate INFL 
is obtained by differencing the logarithm of the consumer price index. GOV measures Chinese 
government spending. M2 is China's broad money supply. RUS indicates the U.S. real interest 
rate  based  on  three  month  Treasury  bills.  Except  for  INFL  and  RUS,  the  variables  are  in 
logarithms.  
GDP, GOV, INFL and GDPF are seasonally adjusted. Data from other countries or regions 
are  taken  from  the  International  Financial  Statistics  Database  of  IMF.  The  data  for  China‘s 
variables, except REER, comes from the State Statistics Bureau, the People's Bank of China, the 
China Ministry of Finance, and General Customs of China. Taiwan‘s annual GDP data comes 
from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database translated into quarterly data. 
The Time Series Characteristics of the Data: Because many macroeconomic variables are 
not stationary, to avoid spurious regressions, the time-series of relevant variables in the models 
need to be tested for stationarity. If the variables turn out to be non-stationary, it then has to be 
determined whether long-run steady relations among those endogenous variables exist. The 
unit root tests and cointegration tests are chosen for these purposes below.  
Table 2:  Unit Root Tests 
  Level  First Difference 
ADF Test  Phillips-Perron 
Test 
ADF Test  Phillips-Perron 
Test 
GDP  -1.53*  -1.45*  -1.88*  -9.26** 
REER  -1.27*  -1.37*  -5.56**  -5.69** 
INFL  -1.24*  -1.89*  -12.00**  -11.38** 
GDPF  -2.26*  -2.64***  -7.00**  -7.02** 
GOV  1.12*  1.21*  -6.10**  -10.10** 
M2  0.20*  -0.44*  -3.91**  -6.01** 
RUS  -1.61*  -1.87*  -6.42**  -6.44** 
* denotes hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance 
*** denotes hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root ca not be rejected at the 5% level of significance 
** denotes rejection of hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root at the 1% level of significance 
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(i) Unit root tests: Both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron test 
are used for unit root tests. Table 2 reports the results of the unit root tests of all relevant 
variables in the models. For the level variables, both tests reveal that the presence of a unit root 
cannot be rejected, which shows that all of these variables are non-stationary. On the other 
hand, the Phillips-Perron test rejects the null hypothesis of presence of a unit root at the 1% 
level of significance for the first difference of all variables, while the ADF test rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 1% level of significance for the first difference of all variables except GDP. The 
ADF test cannot reject the presence of a unit root for the first differenced time series of GDP. 
Here, the result of the Phillips-Perron is adopted to test for GDP. Therefore, it can be asserted 
that all variables in our models are first order integrated variables, namely variables of I (1). 
        Table 3: Cointegration Tests for Alternative Specifications 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue   λ-Trace Statistics   λ-Max Statistics  
Model 1: Series: GDPF INFL REER GDP 
None   0.68   94.67*   62.30* 
At most 1   0.26   32.38*   16.73 
At most 2   0.19   15.65*   11.54 
At most 3   0.07   4.11*   4.11* 
Model 2: Series: GDPF INFL GOV REER GDP 
None   0.70   149.45*   65.79* 
At most 1   0.56   83.66*   45.72* 
At most 2   0.35   37.95*   23.93* 
At most 3   0.17   14.01   10.02 
At most 4   0.07   4.00*   4.00* 
Model 3: Series: GDPF M2 INFL REER GDP 
None   0.69   137.91*   63.97* 
At most 1   0.62   73.94*   52.53* 
At most 2   0.25   21.42   15.68 
At most 3   0.10   5.73   5.70 
At most 4   0.00   0.03   0.03 
Model 4: Series: RUS GDPF INFL REER GDP 
None   0.70   154.51*   66.46* 
At most 1   0.67   88.04*   60.79* 
At most 2   0.27   27.25   17.00 
At most 3   0.15   10.25   8.79 
At most 4   0.03   1.47   1.47 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05% level of significance 
Note: Lags interval (in first difference): 1 to 3 
 
(ii) Cointegration tests:  Because all of the variables in the models were variables of I (1), 
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based  cointegration  tests  are  implemented  using  the  methodology  developed  in  Johansen 
(1995). Table 3 reports the results of Johansen cointegration tests, indicating that there is at least 
one cointegration vector for each VAR model. Therefore, non-stationary data are of less concern 
in this study. In fact, as elaborated in Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990), when variables are co-
integrated, using a VAR in levels model is specified, and the estimates are consistent. Some 
economists suggest that when one really does not know whether there is co-integration or what 
the co-integration vector is, the VAR in levels approach is probably better than the approach 
that tests for co-integration, estimates co-integrating relationships, and then estimates a vector 
error correction (VEC) model (Cochrane, 2005). This suggestion was followed, and the study is 
conducted on the relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output by using 
a VAR in levels model. 
Empirical Results 
This section comprise two subsections: first the empirical results derived from the VAR in levels 
models are presented. Estimation results of the VAR models are given in the form of impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions. Based on these, the empirical analysis of the 
relationship between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output is conducted. Second, 
robustness  of  the  results  obtained  is  investigated  through  adopting  a  different  ordering  of 
variables using a vector error correction (VEC) model specification and substituting RUS for 
GDPF in the first three models as a proxy for external shocks. The goal is to determine whether 
the results change significantly with these changes. 
Results from the VAR in Levels Model: In a VAR analysis, dynamic interactions between 
variables  are  usually  investigated  by  impulse  response  functions  or  forecast  error  variance 
decompositions. In this subsection, empirical results concerning the relationship between the 
RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output are obtained by using these two instruments. 
(i)  Impulse  response  functions:  The  impulse  response  functions  (IRFs)  display  the 
responses of a particular variable to a one-time shock in each of the variables in the system. 
Figures 3 and 4 plot the IRFs of GDP and REER, respectively, calculated from four VAR models. 
Investigation of the IRF graphs yield the results presented below.  
First, when a one standard deviation positive (appreciation) shock to REER takes place, 
there is an obvious decline in GDP, indicating that RMB real rate shocks have a negative impact 
on China‘s output. From the 8th quarter, the contractionary effect is weakened to some extent Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     47 
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but still obviously exists. After 18 quarters, the impact of an RMB real rate shock on output 
turns out to be positive. This effect of an RMB real exchange rate appreciation occurred in all of 
the models estimated, supporting the robustness of the result. This result is in contrast to that of 
other authors, such as Edwards (1986), as well as Kamin and Rogers (2000). In Edwards, of 12 
countries studied, devaluations (revaluations) were contractionary (expansionary) in the short-
term, but after one year, devaluations turned out to be expansionary. In Kamin and Rogers 
(2001), devaluations (revaluations) in Mexico were contractionary (expansionary) in the short-
term as well as in the medium-term. 
Second, in Model 4, which includes RUS, the contractionary effect of positive shocks to 
REER on GDP is significantly less than that in the other models that do not include RUS. The 
former was only about half of the latter. On the other hand, shocks to RUS have a remarkable 
contractionary effect on GDP, and the magnitude of the effect is even larger than that of REER 
shocks. 
These two findings seem to indicate that on one hand capital controls in China are less efficient 
than originally hypothesized. However, capital flows have a significant impact on the Chinese 
economy, which is even larger than the impact of trade (the impact of REER) on the economy.12  
In other words, after accounting for the effect of international finance linkages, the effect of 
RMB real appreciation on China's real economy may be smaller than originally expected. 
Third, a one standard deviation shock to GDP has no obvious impact on REER. After t he 
3rd quarter, the shock causes REER to rise for some time. This effect of an output shock occurs 
in all models estimated, suggesting robustness of the  result. Because the measure of the IRF 
graphs of REER is only about 1/10 relative to the measure of those of GDP, it can be surmised 
that the magnitude of the impact of output shocks on RMB real exchange rate is much less than 
the impact of RMB real rate shocks on output. 
 
 
                            
12 The impact of a rise in RUS on the Chinese economy may function through the following channel: a rise in RUS 
results in a decline in US demand, which in turn causes the demand for China‘s exports to decline. But because we 
have entered GDPF in Model 4, the influence of this channel has already been controlled for. Shi    Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     48 
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Fourth, the impact of shocks on other variables is in accord with economic predictions. For 
example, an increase in the money supply has an obvious expansionary effect and causes real 
exchange rate depreciation in the short-term. GDPF shocks have an expansionary effect as well. 
An increase in government spending results in RMB real exchange rate appreciation in the first 
two quarters, and inflation shocks causes a decline of GDP in the short-term. An important 
exception  is  the  effect  of  INFL  shocks  on  REER,  where  an  increase  in  inflation  causes  real 
exchange rate depreciation. It might be expected that an increase in inflation causes the RMB 
real exchange rate to appreciate because the nominal exchange rate of the RMB has been very 
steady since 1997. In addition, an increase in government spending causes GDP to drop in the 
first two quarters. One possible explanation of this may be that in the short run, government 
spending has a strong crowding-out effect in China.  
In sum, the analyses based on IRFs suggest that an RMB real exchange rate appreciation 
has  a  contractionary  effect  on  China‘s  output.  After  controlling  for  the  influence  of  other 
variables,  RMB  real  appreciation  still  causes  GDP  to  decline,  which  excludes  any  spurious 
correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output.  The empirical results also 
seem to support the hypothesis that the direction of causality between the RMB real exchange 
rate and China‘s output runs from the former to the latter. Finally, external shocks have strong 
effects on China‘s output. In particular, U.S. interest rate shocks have a significant impact on 
China‘s cyclical output. When the effect of RUS is included in the VAR model, the effect of 
REER turns out to be weaker. 
(ii) Variance decompositions:  The IRFs provide a useful tool with which to assess, the 
direction  as  well  as  the  magnitude  of  response  of  a  variable  to  various  kinds  of  shocks. 
However,  variance  decompositions  give  the  fraction  of  the  forecast  error  variance  for  each 
variable that is attributable to its own shocks and to shocks from the other variables in the 
system, which allows one to determine the relative importance of the contribution of different 
shocks  to  the variance of  a  particular variable.  Table 4  provides  the  results  of  the  variance 
decompositions  of  GDP  and  the  RMB  real  exchange  rate  from  the  four  VAR  models.  The 
following results emerge from the variance decompositions. 
First, concerning the source of variation in GDP forecast error, for those models that did not 
include  RUS,  ―own  shocks‖  is  the  most  important  source  at  horizons  of  the  1st  and  2nd 
quarters,  while  the  RMB  real  exchange  rate  shock  is  the  second-most  important  source. Shi          Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     51 
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Beginning  in  the  3rd  quarter,  however,  RMB  real  exchange  rate  shocks  become  the  most 
important source of variation in GDP, accounting for 36-70% of the GDP forecast error variance. 
In the medium and long-term, ―own shocks‖ is the second-most important source in Model 1, 
which  accounts  for  about  24%  of  the  GDP  error  variance,  while  the  contributions  of  ―own 
shocks‖ in Models 2 and 3 decrease greatly, and account for only about 8% of the GDP error 
variance. In contrast, shocks to GDPF and M2 turn out to be the second-most important source 
of the contribution of GDP shocks to the error variance of REER is negligible at the horizons of 
quarters 1 to 4. Over the medium and long-term horizon, the contribution of GDP shocks to the 
error variance of REER is about 30% in Model 1, but drops by a large margin in the other three 
models to under 7% in Models 2 and 3, and to about 12% in Model 4. In contrast, shocks to M2, 
GDPF and RUS in the other three models all have relatively large contributions to the error 
variance of REER. It is worth noting that GOV has very little contribution to the error variance 
of REER. 
Second, in Model 4, which includes RUS, ―own shocks‖ to GDP are the most important 
source of GDP error variance only at the horizons of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarters. Beginning in 
the 4th quarter, however, the RUS shocks become the most important and predominant source of 
variation in GDP, which accounts for 36%-69% of the GDP error variance. ―Own shocks‖ and 
GDPF shocks are the second and the third most important source of the GDP error variance, 
which accounts for about 13% and 11%, respectively, in the long-term. In contrast, REER shocks 
become the fourth most important source of variation in GDP, which accounts for only 7% in the 
long-term. When RUS is included in the VAR model, the power of REER shocks in explaining the 
error variance of GDP significantly declines. This result is consistent with the results obtained in 
the IRFs analysis. 
Third, with respect to the source of variation in the RMB real exchange rate forecast error, ―own 
shocks‖ is the most important and source, accounting for 63%-98% of the forecast error variance 
at  the  horizons  of  quarters  1  to  4  and  40%-70%  after  8  quarters.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
contribution of GDP shocks to the error variance of REER is negligible at the horizons of quarters 
1 to 4. In the medium and long-term horizon, the contribution of GDP shocks to the error variance 
of REER is about 30% in Model 1, but drops by a large margin in the other three models to under 
7% in Model 2 and Model 3, and to about 12% in Model 4. In contrast, shocks to M2, GDPF and 
RUS  in  the  other  three  models  all  have  relatively  large  contributions  to  the  error Shi          Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     52 
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variance of REER. It is worth noting that GOV has very little contribution to the error variance of 
REER. 
 
    Table 4: Variance Decompositions of GDP and REER from VAR Models 
Model_1 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP     
1  0.9  0.6  4.6  0.8  2.4  1.4  30.7  97.8  62.3  0.0     
2  1.2  0.7  3.3  1.0  2.9  5.1  33.0  93.4  60.8  0.5     
3  1.5  0.7  4.9  1.8  2.6  6.1  40.3  89.9  52.2  2.2     
4  1.6  0.7  7.1  1.5  2.5  8.6  44.5  83.1  45.9  6.8     
8  1.8  1.3  5.0  2.0  3.0  14.8  63.4  65.8  28.5  17.4     
12  1.8  1.6  4.4  2.0  4.9  16.5  68.1  53.8  22.6  27.7     
20  1.9  1.8  3.9  1.7  8.2  15.2  63.2  49.4  24.8  33.8     
Model_2 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  GOV 
1  1.0  0.6  8.4  0.8  0.0  0.2  36.7  96.0  47.5  0.0  7.3  3.1 
2  1.3  0.6  6. 7  1.0  0.2  1.3  43.2  96.3  43.1  0.0  6.9  1.4 
3  1.5  0.7  11.0  2.0  0.3  2.0  50.6  94.3  32.9  0.0  5.1  1.8 
4  1.7  0.8  16.0  2.0  0.3  3.2  51.4  91.7  26.7  0.9  5.7  2.4 
8  1.8  1.2  16.0  2.1  0.7  6.6  68.0  85.9  12.3  2.6  3.5  2.7 
12  1.9  1.4  14.0  4.0  1.7  8.4  72.4  78.8  8.1  6.2  3.9  2.6 
20  2.1  1.8  13.0  15.6  3.5  5.2  70.2  68.6  8.4  6.0  5.3  4.7 
Model_3 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  M2 
1  1.0  0.0  5.8  0.5  1.6  1.4  29.4  96.3  48.2  0.0  15.0  1.8 
2  1.3  0.0  3.9  0.3  2.1  6.8  30.7  88.0  37.3  0.3  25.9  4.5 
3  1.5  0.0  5.3  0.4  1.8  7.9  36.4  82.3  27.6  0.7  28.9  8.8 
4  1.7  0.0  7.3  0.3  1.9  8.7  37.9  78.6  22.5  2.1  30.4  10.2 
8  1.8  0.0  6.1  0.5  4.8  12.0  51.5  72.5  9.9  4.3  27.7  10.7 
12  1.9  0.1  4.6  3.1  7.5  12.1  54.8  66.8  7.3  6.4  25.8  11.6 
20  2.1  0.1  6.5  5.5  9.0  8.9  52.3  59.9  7.8  4.0  24.4  21.6 
Model_4 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  RUS 
1  0.5  1.0  13.2  2.6  0.7  8.2  12.4  85.3  61.9  0.0  11.8  3.9 
2  0.8  1.2  10.5  3.4  0.5  13.3  10.7  77.1  53.5  1.5  24.7  4.7 
3  0.9  1.5  14.8  5.5  0.8  12.2  11.2  70.7  42.8  3.7  30.4  7.9 
4  1.0  1.7  18.5  4.7  1.1  13.1  9.5  63.9  35.1  6.3  35.8  12.0 
8  1.2  1.8  14.8  6.3  0.6  15.1  9.3  54.6  16.3  8.6  58.9  15.4 
12  1.4  1.9  10.2  5.6  2.2  16.5  7.8  52.6  11.3  12.1  68.5  13.1 
20  1.7  2.0  12.0  4.1  4.1  13.5  6.6  40.4  12.8  11.6  64.6  30.4 
 
Notes:  1.  The  two  columns  below  a  variable  give  the  fraction  of  the  forecast  error  variance  for  GDP  and  REER 
attributable to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon, with the left black column indicating the fraction 
for GDP. 2. The columns below ―S.E.‖ contain the forecast error of GDP and REER at the given forecast horizon 
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In sum, the analyses based on the variance decompositions suggest three conclusions. First, 
shocks to the RMB real exchange rate have a large contribution to variation in China‘s output in 
the models that do not include the U.S. interest rate and some contribution to the variation in 
China‘s output in models that include the U.S. interest rate. This suggests that the possibility of 
spurious correlation between the RMB real exchange rate and China‘s output can be excluded. 
Second,  except  for  the  basic  model  (Model  1),  the  shocks  to  GDP  account  for  a  small 
contribution in the variation of the RMB real exchange rate, the contribution being negligible at 
horizons of 1 to 4 quarters, suggesting reverse causation running from the GDP to the RMB real 
exchange rate can be excluded. Third, when the U.S. interest rate is included in the VAR model, 
the power of REER shocks in explaining the error variance of GDP significantly declines. 
Robustness Analysis: The results obtained in the previous subsection may be specific to the 
selected ordering of endogenous variables. Therefore, it is interesting to estimate the VAR models 
with different and  plausible orderings. In addition, because all variables in our models were 
variables of I (1) and there are cointegration vectors for each model, it was worth trying to check 
the  results  obtained  from  the  VAR  in  the  level  models  with  those  obtained  from  the 
cointegration-restricted  VAR  models  (i.e.,  the  VEC  models).  Furthermore,  the  results  of  the 
previous subsection suggest that the magnitude of the effect of RMB real exchange rate shocks on 
China‘s output diminishes markedly when the U.S. interest rate is included in the VAR model. 
Therefore, it is also interesting to substitute RUS for GDPF as a proxy for external shocks in the 
first three VAR models. This subsection discusses the robustness of the results after investigating 
these three points. 
(i) Different ordering: In their VAR models, Kamin and Rogers (2000) adopted different 
orderings from the ones used in this analysis. Except for GDPF, variables in the four VAR 
models are ordered in Kamin and Rogers (2000) as follows: 
Model  1:  REER→INFL→GDP;  Model  2:  GOV→REER→INFL→GDP;  Model  3: 
REER→M2→INFL→GDP; and Model 4: RUS→REER→INFL→GDP. 
If the assumption of price stickiness in the short run is relaxed, the above orderings seem 
plausible. For example, in Model 1, an appreciation of the real exchange rate shifts demand 
away from non-traded goods, resulting in a decrease in the price of non-traded goods and the 
general price level for a given level of the nominal exchange rate. The adjustment of the price 
level then causes the change of output. Shi          Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     54 
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The four VAR models are re-estimated by adopting the above orderings, generating results 
quite similar to those of the previous subsection. Only the impulse response functions of GDP 
from  the  four  VAR  models  using  the  orderings  adopted  by  Kamin  and  Rogers  (2000)  are 
presented (Figure 5). 
(ii) Results from VEC model:  The VEC models to be estimated have the following form: 




Δ = Δ + , :IID =1,4
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l l l l l l l l l
t t i t i t t
i
Y α ECM + Γ Y ε ε o ,Ω l , 
where   ll
tt ECM βY
1
-1 -1 =   is  the  error  correction  term  reflecting  the  long-run  equilibrium 
relationship between the variables.   l β  is the matrix of cointegration vectors. The coefficient 
vector 
l α  reflects how fast the deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected through a series 
of  partial  short-run  adjustments. 
l
i Γ   is  a  parameter  matrix  of  variables  in  differences;  the 
elements of them reflect the short-term effect of the variables on the dependent variable. 
The four VEC models are estimated by adopting the same orderings as in the previous 
subsection. Investigation of the estimation results of the four VEC models shows that the IRFs 
of the VEC models are very similar to those of the VAR models in direction and dynamic path 
of  responses.  The  results  of  variance  decompositions  are  basically  similar  as  well.  One 
difference, however, is that the effect of various shocks in the VEC models seems more lasting 
than that in the VAR models. Taking the response of GDP to the REER shocks as an example, 
the contractionary effect of an appreciation of REER is sustained longer before the expansionary 
effect  appears.  Only  the  results  of  variance  decompositions  of  GDP  and  REER,  as  well  as 
impulse response functions of GDP from the VEC models (Table 5 and Figure 6) are presented.  
 (iii) Substitution of RUS for GDPF in VAR model: When RUS is substituted for GDPF in 
the VAR models and the first three VAR models of the previous subsection are re-estimated, it 
is found that when compared to the situation of the original models using GDPF as a proxy 
variable for external shocks:  
-  the  IRFs  of  three  new  VAR  models  are  similar  to  those  of  Model  4  of  the  previous 
subsection,  such  that  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  of  RMB  exchange  rate  shocks  on  China‘s 
output is diminished, especially in the medium and long-term;  
-  the expansionary effect of REER shocks appears earlier; Shi          Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     55 
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      Table 5: Variance Decompositions of GDP and REER from VEC Models 
Model_1 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP     
1  1.0  0.6  2.7  0.2  3.1  2.8  30.4  97.1  63.8  0.0     
2  1.5  0.7  1.7  0.1  4.2  8.4  29.9  91.0  64.2  0.6     
3  2.0  0.7  2.0  0.2  4.0  11.1  35.2  86.6  58.8  2.2     
4  2.5  0.8  2.8  0.1  4.5  14.6  39.0  79.4  53.8  5.9     
8  3.3  1.9  1.6  0.0  3.7  22.7  59.9  67.6  34.8  9.7     
12  4.0  2.8  1.1  0.1  3.3  24.9  70.1  63.8  25.4  11.2     
20  5.1  4.2  0.8  0.1  2.8  26.2  78.6  61.6  17.8  12.1     
Model_2 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  GOV 
1  1.0  0.6  8.3  0.5  0.1  0.4  37.8  95.3  45.9  0.0  7.8  3.8 
2  1.4  0.6  6.7  0.8  0.2  1.7  45.6  95.7  40.6  0.0  6.9  1.8 
3  1.8  0.7  11.9  2.0  0.3  2.3  53.2  94.2  29.7  0.0  5.0  1.5 
4  2.0  0.7  18.4  2.1  0.3  3.0  53.6  92.7  22.6  0.4  5.1  1.8 
8  2.4  1.3  23.0  6.0  0.1  3.1  67.0  88.8  7.6  0.6  2.2  1.5 
12  2.7  1.5  27.2  10.0  0.1  2.6  67.3  84.9  3.5  1.0  2.0  1.6 
20  3.8  1.6  33.0  11.3  0.1  2.4  63.2  82.9  1.6  1.2  2.2  2.1 
Model_3 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  M2 
1  1.0  0.0  4.4  0.7  2.3  1.8  29.9  94.8  46.4  0.0  17.0  2.7 
2  1.5  0.0  3.0  0.4  2.9  7.0  32.1  86.2  33.9  0.2  28.1  6.3 
3  2.0  0.0  3.3  0.4  2.9  8.2  39.1  79.6  23.2  0.3  31.5  11.5 
4  2.5  0.0  4.5  0.3  3.1  8.9  42.0  76.3  17.4  1.0  32.9  13.5 
8  3.3  0.0  5.0  0.3  4.1  9.8  55.8  70.5  5.6  0.7  29.5  18.8 
12  4.1  0.1  5.2  0.3  4.6  10.3  58.6  68.1  2.6  0.6  29.0  20.7 
20  5.5  0.1  5.6  0.9  4.8  10.6  58.6  66.8  1.3  0.7  29.6  21.0 
Model_4 
T  S.E.  GDPF  INFL  REER  GDP  RUS 
1  0.5  1.0  13.6  1.5  1.0  10.4  12.0  81.5  58.9  0.0  14.6  6.6 
2  0.7  1.5  10.4  1.4  0.7  17.1  10.3  71.1  47.8  1.4  30.8  9.0 
3  1.1  2.0  14.9  2.0  0.6  17.0  11.3  63.6  34.1  2.9  39.2  14.5 
4  1.3  2.5  19.4  1.3  0.6  18.4  9.7  55.8  24.7  4.1  45.7  20.4 
8  2.0  3.5  17.1  0.5  0.3  22.6  12.4  43.5  7.1  2.9  63.2  30.5 
12  2.4  4.4  12.3  0.9  1.2  26.3  13.9  39.6  2.9  2.4  69.7  30.8 
20  2.9  5.6  8.1  2.2  2.7  31.3  14.3  37.9  1.2  2.0  73.7  26.6 
 
Notes: 1. The two columns below a variable give the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP and REER 
attributable to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon, with the left black column indicating the 
fraction for GDP. 2. The columns below ―S.E.‖ contain the forecast error of GDP and REER at the given forecast 
horizon.Shi   Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     57 
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  - with respect to the source of variation in GDP forecast error, in all three new VAR 
models, the RUS shocks become the most important and predominant source of variation in 
GDP, while, in contrast, REER shocks turn out to be the second, the third, and the fourth most 
important sources of the GDP error variance, respectively. The contributions of ―own shocks‖ 
and M2 to variation in GDP exceed the contribution of REER in the second and third new 
models; and 
Table 6: Variance Decompositions of GDP from VAR Models with RUS 
 
Model_1 
T  S.E.  RUS  INFL  REER  GDP   
 1   0.5   6.8   0.1   24.4   68.8   
 2   0.8   10.1   3.7   23.4   62.8   
 3   0.9   13.7   6.0   26.2   54.18   
 4   1.0   18.2   6.4   25.8   49.6   
 8   1.2   46.9   2.7   26.9   23.6   
 12   1.4   58.0   2.3   23.4   16.2   
 20   1.7   55.7   4.7   20.1   19.6   
Model_2 
T  S.E.  RUS  INFL  REER  GDP  GOV 
 1   0.6   8.0   0.0   26.6   63.1   2.3 
 2   0.8   9.8   5.9   23.9   58.7   1.7 
 3   0.9   13.0   10.3   25.2   49.9   1.5 
 4   1.0   16.5   11.4   24.3   44.4   3.4 
 8   1.2   42.8   7.0   23.4   23.7   3.1 
 12   1.3   59.1   4.7   17.6   16.2   2.4 
 20   1.6   54.9   7.6   16.5   19.0   2.1 
 Model_3 
T  S.E.  RUS  INFL  REER  GDP  M2 
 1   0.5   7.8   0.1   22.3   59.6   10.2 
 2   0.8   8.6   0.8   18.3   48.4   23.9 
 3   0.9   11.7   2.2   18.9   39.9   27.3 
 4   1.0   14.5   2.5   18.3   36.3   28.4 
 8   1.1   42.9   1.6   16.7   20.1   18.7 
 12   1.3   60.6   1.1   11.7   13.6   13.0 
 20   1.6   57.9   1.9   12.1   14.3   13.9 
 
Note: 1. The column below a variable gives the fraction of the forecast error variance for GDP that is attributable 
to shocks to the variable at the given forecast horizon. 2. The column below ―S.E.‖ contains the forecast error of 
GDP at the given forecast horizon. Shi  Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     59 
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(4) The effects of other shocks on GDP are similar between the new models and the original 
ones. Figure 7 and Table 6 provide IRFs and variance decompositions of GDP from the three 
new VAR models, with RUS replacing GDPF as a proxy variable for external shocks. 
In sum, the robustness analysis confirms that the basic result - shocks to the RMB real 
exchange rate have a contractionary effect on China‘s output  - does not change even if the 
orderings  of  Kamin  and  Rogers  (2000)  are  adopted  or  a  VEC  model  specification  is  used. 
However, after including the international finance linkage of the Chinese economy, the effect of 
the REER shock on China‘s output and the power of REER shocks in explaining changes in 
China‘s output turn out to be relatively small, while U.S. interest rate shocks have a relatively 
large effect on China‘s output, such that the magnitude of it exceeds that of RMB exchange rate 
shocks. 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigates  the  relationship  between  the  RMB  real  exchange  rate and  China‘s 
output by using the VAR model technique. The empirical analysis reveals several interesting 
findings. First, even after the source of spurious correlation is controlled for, RMB real exchange 
rate appreciation leads to a decline in China‘s output, suggesting that currency appreciations 
have been contractionary in China, as suggested by traditional open economy macroeconomics.
  Second, when the international finance linkages of the Chinese economy are accounted 
for, the effect of RMB real exchange rate shocks on China‘s output and the power of the shocks 
in explaining the change in China‘s output are relatively small, while the effect of U.S. interest 
rate shocks on China‘s output is relatively large. The intuition behind this finding is that the 
effectiveness of China‘s capital controls has eroded over time and the scales of capital inflows 
and  outflows  have  become  large  enough  such  that  external  shocks  through  international 
financial  channels  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  Chinese  economy,  which  exceeds  the 
influence of external shocks through international trade channels. 
Third, besides shocks to the RMB real exchange rate and the U.S. interest rate, shocks to 
domestic  money  supply  and  foreign  demand  have  important  effects  on  China‘s  output. 
However,  government  spending  shocks  have  less  power  in  explaining  changes  in  China‘s 
output. Shi  Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     61 
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  The conclusion that currency appreciations are contractionary in China is remarkably 
different from those made by similar empirical work on developing countries. The possible 
explanations for this difference are outlined below:  
- first, in the existing research on the ―contractionary devaluations‖ effect in developing 
countries,  devaluations  usually  take  place  under  an  abnormal  environment  of  currency  or 
financial crisis and thus have been associated with economic recession, but RMB devaluations 
did not happen in the case of currency or financial crisis until now;    
- second, urban economic reform begun in the early 1990s has caused many people to lose 
their jobs and traditional benefits, such as healthcare, pensions, and education. In turn, this has 
strengthened the motive for precautionary savings in households in urban and township areas. 
Therefore, the income reallocation effect as well as the real cash balance and the real wealth 
effects of currency appreciation may not play a very great role; 
- third, China has absorbed a large amount of foreign direct investment for many years. As 
a result, the technological progress and production capacity of China‘s manufacturing industry 
have been promoted rapidly, the substitutability of home-produced capital goods (including 
those produced by foreign investment enterprises) for imported goods has been strengthened 
and, therefore, the effect of the RMB real exchange rate on domestic investment spending is not 
clear;  
- fourth, one condition under which devaluation can lead to a reduction in national output 
is that imports initially exceed exports (Krugman and Taylor, 1978). China‘s trade balance has 
been in surplus for more than 10 years, except for 1993, and therefore does not satisfy that 
condition; 
-  finally,  because  of  the  characteristics  of  processing  trade  in  China‘s  manufacturing 
industry, as well as the administrative controls on prices (especially in the service sector), the 
supply-side effect of the RMB exchange rate on output is also uncertain. In short, it seems that 
the expenditure-changing effect and supply-side effect of RMB exchange rate changes have not 
been that remarkable in practice until now. Therefore, the effect of RMB real exchange rate 
shocks  on  China‘s  output  is  mainly  embodied  in  the  expenditure-switching  effect  as 
emphasized by traditional macroeconomic theory. Consequently, appreciations in the RMB are 
likely contractionary. Shi  Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     62 
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It  is  worth  pointing  out  however,  that  concluding  that  appreciations  have  been 
contractionary in China does not necessarily mean that China should continue maintaining an 
undervalued  exchange  rate,  since  the  value  of  the  RMB  has  already  caused  the  Chinese 
economy to run into internal and external imbalances in the past several years. Figure 2 (above) 
shows that China‘s real GDP has been running above its long-term trend since 2003, and this 
kind  of  deviation  is  expanding.  Indeed,  overheating  of  the  Chinese  economy  is  obvious. 
Undoubtedly, continuing undervaluation of the RMB will further aggravate imbalances in the 
Chinese  economy.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conclusion  that  appreciations  have  been 
contractionary in China implies that relative to other effects of changes in the exchange rate, the 
expenditure-switching effect has been predominant in China until now. Hence, it is effective to 
use the orthodox Swan Diagram to analyze macroeconomic policy issues in China.  According 
to the Swan Diagram, allowing the RMB to appreciate will be helpful to the Chinese economy in 
realizing internal and external balances (Shi, 2006). 
Additionally, in recent years China‘s capital account surplus has increased rapidly along 
with increases in the current account surplus. The rapid increase in the ―double surplus‖ has 
caused China‘s foreign exchange reserves to expand in an uncontrolled manner.  In addition, 
the money supply and domestic credit have expanded passively, aggravating overheating of the 
Chinese  economy  and  the  difficulties  for  the  Chinese  government's  macroeconomic 
management.  In  particular,  as  China‘s  capital  account  is  gradually  liberalized  and  the 
effectiveness of capital controls erodes over time, ―hot money‖ flows into China will expand, 
becoming a major reason for rapid expansion of foreign exchange reserves.  
The  empirical  work  indicates  that  the  effect  of  shocks  on  China‘s  output  through 
international financial channels (as represented by U.S. interest rate shocks) exceeds that of 
international trade channels (as represented by RMB real exchange rate shocks), suggesting it is 
important for the Chinese authorities to handle the capital inflow problem correctly. The inflow 
of ―hot money‖ in recent years is mainly a response to expectation of RMB appreciation, and an 
important  reason  for  the  persistent  existence  of  these  expectations  is  undervaluation  of  the 
RMB. Therefore, allowing the RMB to appreciate at a faster rate towards its equilibrium will 
lessen expectations of RMB appreciation, thus relaxing pressure on the Chinese authorities due 
to the rapid increase in foreign exchange reserves. 
   Shi  Chap.2: Currency Appreciations     63 
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